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INTRODUCTION
In an article published in 2008, Richard Marcus hypothesized that
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)1 might “boomerang” against
some of its proponents.2 Once federal courts got a taste for control over
nationwide litigation, he argued, they might actually expand, not
constrict, the scope of class certification—the better to bring a decisive
end to the litigation they find themselves in charge of.3 Moreover,
Marcus noted, federal courts could even cite CAFA’s “jurisdictional
policies”—particularly its stated policy that nationwide class actions
should be “considered” in federal court—as a formal hook for doing so.4

1. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 [hereinafter CAFA], Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1765, 1789 (2008).
3. Id. at 1817.
4. Id.
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Now, ten years after CAFA’s passage, it’s worth checking in to see
whether this possibility is actually coming to pass. At least if we focus
on the Supreme Court, it hasn’t. Far from it. A series of seminal
Supreme Court class action decisions since 2011 have instead made
marketable claims even more resistant to class certification than they
were pre-CAFA.
The result is turning out to be a victory not for mass tort
nationalism, but somewhat surprisingly, for federalism. The reason is
straightforward. Class certification is many things—an engine for
economizing on the disposition of claims, for leveling the playing field
between institutional defendants and individual plaintiffs, for buying
“global peace.” But in federal courts’ hands, as Marcus noted, it is also a
mechanism for federal consolidation of control over mass claims.5 By
making wholesale class certification of nationwide disputes harder to
obtain at the federal level, the Roberts Court has tended to decentralize
mass tort litigation—spreading the disposition of interests at issue in that
litigation back among state and federal courts in the process.
Professor Maria Glover has termed this “happenstantial”
federalism—the accidental federalism of a Court that has constricted the
federal class action for reasons independent of federalism concerns.6
And it is certainly true that the Roberts Court has not invoked federalism
per se in its biggest class action cases. Even so, this Article raises the
possibility that the Court’s class action cases might, in fact, reflect an
un-theorized or intuitive sense that federalism principles shape federal
courts’ use of the class action.
This connection is most evident in what seems to be a minor entry
in the Roberts Court’s canon of class action-related decisions, Smith v.
Bayer Corp.7 Bayer is that most arcane creature, an Anti-Injunction Act8
case. It has largely been ignored in treatments of the Roberts Court’s
class action canon. But it points to a larger, interesting idea: namely, that
narrow constructions of the federal class action rule reinforce Congress’s
control of federal courts’ role in the federal system.9 Because separation

5. Id. at 1769.
6. J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance in the Post-Class Action Era: The
Problems and Promise of Non-Removable State Actions in Multi-District Litigation, 5 J. TORT LAW
1, 5, 7 (2014).
7. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (U.S. 2011).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012).
9. See generally Mark Moller, Agenda Setting and the Class Action (Soc. Sci. Research
Network, Aug. 11, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478953
(developing this idea in much greater detail).
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of powers is “an aspect of federalism”10—a mechanism through which
federalism is protected—this idea helps connect the Court’s
“happenstantial” class action federalism with constitutional principle.
This Article develops this idea in three parts. Part I briefly
summarizes Richard Marcus’s account of CAFA’s potential to catalyze a
kind of hyper-aggressive mass tort nationalism. Part II then reviews how
the Roberts Court’s stinting approach to class actions is, to the contrary,
throwing a lifeline to federalism. Part III ends by showing how Bayer
points to a link, so far undeveloped in the case law, between that stinting
approach and the separation of powers—a link that, were it to be
developed further in future cases, could make federalism not just
“happenstantial,” but integral to our understanding of the scope and
reach of federal class actions.
I. THE END OF MASS LITIGATION FEDERALISM?
Prior to passage of the Class Action Fairness Act, several features
of the framework for diversity jurisdiction conspired to make it
relatively easy to file nationwide class actions in state court: the
complete diversity requirement; the bar in Zahn v. International Paper
on aggregating, or adding together, the separate and distinct claims of
individual class members to meet the amount in controversy
requirement;11 the rule barring removal if any defendant is a citizen of
the forum state;12 the requirement that defendants unanimously consent
to removal;13 and the one year sunset on defendant’s removal rights in
cases where original jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1332.14
CAFA expands federal courts’ control over multi-state class actions
in several ways. First, it jettisons the complete diversity rule and makes
the citizenship of putative class members count toward minimum
diversity.15 Second, it abrogates the Zahn rule, permitting plaintiffs to
aggregate the value of individual class members’ claims while setting an
aggregate amount in controversy requirement of $5 million.16 It also gets
rid of a number of constraints on removal, like the home state and

10. Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 DUKE L. J. 75, 128 (2001).
11. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 302 (1973).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(2)(A) (2012).
14. Id. § 1446(c)(1).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2012).
16. Id. § 1332(d)(2).
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unanimity rules, while also giving removal rights to class members.17
Since CAFA’s passage, several leading procedural scholars have
suggested the statute may prove to be a catalyst for what amounts to an
aggressively nationalist approach to the resolution of claims arising out
of mass injury events. In an article entitled “Assessing CAFA’s Stated
Jurisdictional Policy,” Richard Marcus summarized (although not
uncritically) this idea.18 “CAFA,” he wrote, “was justified on the basis of
essentially two jurisdictional policies: it provided that federal class
action procedures would be available for handling many state law class
action cases, and it ensured a federal forum for cases of national
significance.”19 Marcus’s article goes on to describe how federal courts,
relying on these policies, “may take what Judge Easterbrook famously
called the ‘central planner’ attitude of preferring settlements that offer a
national solution for all class members,” achieved through more
“creative” and expansive uses of class device.20
To be sure, Marcus noted, some of CAFA’s proponents had hoped
that federal courts, kitted out by Republican appointed judges, would be
more hostile to class actions than their state counterparts.21 But things
change. Later generations of federal judges may prove less hostile.22
More importantly, given their new responsibility for nationwide
litigation conferred through CAFA, they may come to feel responsible
for bringing that litigation to a decisive and fair conclusion.23 All of this
might lead federal courts, over time, to liberalize the availability of the
class device.24 This might involve the loosening of Amchem v. Windsor’s
requirement that settlement class actions must satisfy a heightened
“predominance” inquiry.25 Or it might involve loosening the conditions
on certification of limited fund class actions, along the lines suggested
recently by Sergio Campos.26
Marcus suggested (although, again, not uncritically) that federal
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2012).
18. See Marcus, supra note 2.
19. Id. at 1789.
20. Id. at 1769.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1821 (noting the potential “slippery slope” effect of federal courts’ sense of
“expanded responsibility” for national market litigation).
24. Id at 1769; see also id. at 1821.
25. Id. at 1818. Marcus suggests the possibility obliquely, id. at 1818 (noting criticism of this
aspect of Amchem), but then argues that abandoning Amchem is not necessary to achieve CAFA’s
jurisdictional policies. Id. at 1819.
26. See generally Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059
(2012).
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courts might, moreover, claim some formal support for doing so in
CAFA’s “findings” section, which includes a statement of congressional
policies—including an endorsement of the use of class actions to protect
consumers as well as a stated preference for national solutions to mass
litigation.27
To appreciate Marcus’s point that the line to federal resolution of
mass tort litigation leads through the class action, you have to appreciate
class actions not just as a “joinder” mechanism, but also as a mechanism
for transferring or shifting litigation into federal court. It’s easiest to
understand this shifting effect of class certification by thinking through
the trajectory of a non-class proceeding.
Taking away the class action option in a mass tort puts control over
litigation on behalf of the victims of the tort in the hands of each
individual claim owner. As I discuss at length in another article, this
decentralization inevitably spreads litigation across the federal state
boundaries for two reasons. First, in a non-class setting, claim owners
often have a choice between federal and state forums, and can exercise
some control over where their case proceeds in either line of courts.
They can sue in federal court by asserting a federal theory of relief. Or
they can keep their case in state court by manipulating the party structure
of the suit (i.e., joining non-diverse parties), the amount in controversy,
or the forum (i.e., suing in the defendant’s home state).28 Second, claim
owners invariably have different forum preferences. As a result, giving
claim owners complete control over how their claims are prosecuted
tends to lead to different theories of relief and different party structures
supporting different forum choices—spreading class litigation, in turn,
among competing federal and state forums.29
Federal class actions change all of this, again for two reasons. First,
they put the named plaintiff in control of the class members’ claim. The
named plaintiff picks the legal theory. The named plaintiff picks the
defendants to sue. And the named plaintiff makes the initial choice of
forum. By giving the named plaintiff who prefers a federal forum a
monopoly over the structure and forum choice of the class members’
claims, the result, inevitably, is to force some claims into the federal
court system that would otherwise have proceeded in state court if
prosecuted according to the preferences of their owners.30
Second, the rules of subject matter jurisdiction applicable to class
27.
28.
29.
30.
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actions exacerbate the shifting effect of the federal class action, because
those rules suck some claims into federal court that could not be litigated
there if prosecuted independently. This was true pre-CAFA. The class
mode of litigation triggered a loophole in the usual rules of diversity
jurisdiction: It allowed federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over nondiverse class members who lacked federal rights to sue simply by virtue
of diversity between the defendants and named plaintiffs.31
Post-CAFA, the class action loophole is wider still. The presence of
minimum diversity between (1) either a single named plaintiff or
putative class members, on one hand, and (2) just one defendant, on the
other, triggers jurisdiction over the other class members, again,
regardless of their lack of diversity with the defendant or their inability
to assert a federal cause of action.32
All of this makes the class action a tremendous device for shifting
and consolidating federal control over litigation that would otherwise
disperse among multiple forums, including state forums. It accordingly
would be an essential tool for federal courts seeking to take
“responsibility” for concluding the national litigation over which CAFA
gives them control.33 And because it is such an essential tool, there is an
air of plausibility to what, as Marcus said, would be a supremely ironic
scenario: that CAFA, in the end, might lead federal courts to “expand[]
the importance of [federal] class action[s].”34
II. THE ROBERTS COURT THROWS FEDERALISM A LIFELINE
The Roberts Court, though, has not proven amenable, so far, to the
type of complex-litigation nationalism sketched by Professor Marcus.
This is no slam against his article. His predictions were not about what
would happen, but what could; they were focused on much longer-term
time horizons and they were also focused, arguably, less on the Supreme
Court than on lower courts.
The last focus, incidentally, makes evident good sense: procedural
law sometimes develops “bottom up” rather than “top down”; meaning,
transformation in governing doctrine often bubbles up from trial courts
as they adapt the law pragmatically to meet immediate case management
challenges.35 Those changes, which often involve a mixture of
31. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 364 (1921).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
33. Marcus, supra note 2, at 1821.
34. Id.
35. Mark
Moller,
Procedural
Siloing,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug.
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/08/procedural-siloing.html.
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tendentious interpretations and outright noncompliance with existing
doctrine, are then later ratified by the Supreme Court. So, in the long
run, the Roberts Court may have remarkably little effect on the
development of class action law.
Even so, there’s no doubt that the Supreme Court, even if it doesn’t
fully control the development of procedural law, is an important
influence. Bottom-up law or not, it’s still well worth paying attention to
what the Court says about procedure. And, whether by accident or not,
the Roberts Court has actually tended to rescue to a degree, federalism
from CAFA, at least in the near term.
This is the product of two developments, which I explore in the
next two sections.
A.

Containing Class Actions, Decentralizing Mass Litigation

The first of these developments is the Roberts Court’s treatment of
the federal class action. CAFA, Professor Marcus has argued, may
catalyze more aggressive or “creative” federal uses of the class device to
fashion national settlements of mass claims.36 Yet, in Wal-Mart Stores
Inc. v. Dukes37 and Comcast v. Behrend,38 the Court has gone the other
way, amping up the limits on federal class actions.
In Wal-Mart, the Court rejected efforts to ground certification on
the pleadings and required, instead, that plaintiffs, to meet their Rule 23
burden, must demonstrate that their claims can be resolved based on
common proof and, therefore, are susceptible to common answers.39 In
addition, Wal-Mart seems to largely doom efforts to certify damages
claims under Rule 23(b)(2) and casts significant doubt on the continued
viability of econometric models of proof as a vehicle for rendering mass
claims amenable to Rule 23(b)(3) classing.40
Comcast is an equivocal decision that, read one way, affects
availability of class certification very little and, read differently, may
extend Wal-Mart’s “common answers” test to the damages phase, in
effect requiring plaintiffs to show that damages can be calculated based
on common proof. This would make certification of large-scale damages
claims particularly difficult in cases where there is a large degree of
variability in the extent of class members’ injuries.41
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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All of this has led Professor Glover and others to call the Roberts
Court era (with some self-conscious exaggeration) a “post-class action
era.”42 Of course, the class action is still with us and will remain a major
part of federal civil litigation for the foreseeable future. But the Court’s
cases have given real teeth to the idea that it is an “exception to the usual
rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the named parties
only.”43 In the process, the Court has made it very difficult, if not
impossible, to certify large-scale class actions, particularly in suits where
the claims are individually marketable. In the broad run of cases, mass
torts have to proceed, if at all, either on an individual basis or through
multiple smaller-scale class actions.
Relative to a counterfactual world in which certification of
nationwide classes were more readily available, the effect of the Roberts
Courts’ certification decisions can be characterized as pro-federalism.
Litigation that would be sucked into federal court if nationwide
certification were available is, because it is not available, washing back
into state court in the form of small-scale or individualized litigation that
is not removable. Professor Glover’s article catalogues the steady
drumbeat of state-level, non-aggregated mass tort litigation postCAFA.44 The pattern reflected in the notorious Vioxx litigation45 has
been typical. There, in the absence of the class action option, suits
representing 20,000 plaintiffs were (as of 2008) filed against the
pharmaceutical giant in, or removed to, federal court (and transferred by
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to Judge Fallon in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana), while actions
representing an even larger number of plaintiffs (30,000) remained
pending in state court.46
This pattern is not due to state or federal courts’ improper
application of CAFA. A small part of the story is that CAFA itself
preserves some room for state-level class litigation through its home
state and local controversy exceptions.47 But the much larger part of the
story is that CAFA only expands federal jurisdiction over aggregated
proceedings. Non-aggregated proceedings—i.e., individual suitsthat are
not proposed to be joined with lots of similar claims for a joint trial—
in Amgen and Comcast, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 301, 323.
42. Glover, supra note 6, at 7.
43. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979).
44. Glover, supra note 6, at 8-10.
45. See generally In re Vioxx Products Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La. 2007).
46. Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class Action
is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2214 (2008).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)-(4) (2012).
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proceed under the usual pre-CAFA jurisdictional rules and, under those
rules, are much easier to lock into state court (whether through joinder of
non-diverse parties, or through suit in the defendant’s home state).
The result is a victory of sorts not only for the decentralized model
of mass tort management, but also for federalism. Proposed nationwide
class actions are removable to federal court, but the upshot of removal is
to break them apart, remitting them to individualized litigation or
smaller state-by-state class actions, which inevitably spread across the
federal-state boundary.
There are certainly pros and cons associated with this development.
On the con side, the model is potentially costly—for defendants, who
have to incur the cost of duplicative discovery, and for the judicial
system as a whole, which must oversee that duplicative discovery. But
Professor Glover has shown that federal and state courts post-CAFA are
expanding “bottom up” efforts to coordinate their management of mass
litigation.48 As a result, the “version” of complex litigation federalism
we get in a post-CAFA world may be a new form of cooperative
federalism—what might, borrowing from Professor Glover, be called
“post-class action federalism”49—in which federal and state judges have
new incentives to collaboratively resolve litigation arising out of mass
injury events.
Ideally anyway, this cooperative effort can not only mitigate the
transaction costs of decentralized management, but can also hedge
against the risk that one judge’s skewed view of the case colors the
merits and settlement negotiations across the entire mass tort;50 provide
parties with better information about the merits of mass tort at the
settlement table by giving them a wider sample of litigated cases;51 and
inject more sensitivity to local conditions and local law into management
of cross-border disputes.
B.

CAFA’s Limits

What, though, of CAFA’s findings? Richard Marcus suggested
these findings as, if not the source, then the formal cover for the
hypothesized “boomerang” effect he described, in which CAFA ends up
48. Glover, supra note 6, at 12-15.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Cf. Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign Affairs Removal,
and Complete Preemption, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1795 (2007).
51. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Glover,
supra note 6, at 25-31 (proposing that “coordinated redundancy” can help improve the information
available to settling parties and enhance the construction of mass tort settlement grids).
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fuelling, not curtailing, class action enforcement.52 His argument, as
mentioned above, looks to the long term, and so recent trends hardly
falsify his hypothesis. Even so, the idea that CAFA’s findings might fuel
a rethink of all the different doctrines that constrain federal courts’
authority over mass litigation is having, at best, mixed success so far in
the Roberts Court.
CAFA’s findings are an outgrowth of the principles that govern the
interpretation of Congress’s jurisdictional enactments. In a series of
cases, the Court has laid down the principle that Congress’s control over
federal jurisdiction is safeguarded through interpretation—meaning
through narrow default constructions of those jurisdictional grants,
coupled with a clear statement rule that requires Congress to speak
clearly if it wants to override the default and expand federal
jurisdiction.53 Together, the narrow defaults and clear statement
condition for overriding them reflect the familiar idea that separation of
powers is a federalism safeguard. The narrow constructions funnel
expansive definitions of federal courts’ jurisdiction back through the
political process; the clear statement condition for overriding these
constructions reinforces the political process’s “procedural safeguards
for federalism” (that is, the hurdles that federal law must surmount in
order to get passed).54
One obvious goal of CAFA’s findings section, in turn, was to
provide the requisite “clear statement” needed to counter the traditional
rule of narrow jurisdictional construction. The Roberts Court adopted
this understanding of the findings quite recently in Dart Cherokee
Operating Basin Co., LLC. v. Owens,55 where the Court considered
whether a removing party has to include in the notice of removal proof
that the suit meets the amount in controversy threshold.56 The decision
stemmed from an appeal of an order denying a motion to remand a case
removed under CAFA, and the plaintiff in the case argued that CAFA,
like all removal statutes, should be construed “narrowly,” meaning

52. Marcus, supra note 2, at 1789.
53. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164-65
(2008) (quoting Am. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951)) (emphasizing the
“established principle that ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against
expansion by judicial interpretation . . .’”); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459-60 (1990); Finley v.
United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989).
54. Cf. Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1681, 1683 (2008).
55. Dart Cherokee Operating Basin Co., LLC. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (U.S. 2014).
56. Id. at 551.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/6

10

Moller: The New Class Action Federalism

2015]

THE NEW CLASS ACTION FEDERALISM

871

construed in a way that raises more, not fewer, hurdles to removal.57
Justice Ginsburg rejected this argument, largely based on the plain
meaning of applicable federal removal provisions.58
But in a key passage, Justice Ginsburg also invoked CAFA’s
findings section: “We need not,” she wrote, “here decide whether such
a[n] [antiremoval] presumption is proper in mine-run diversity cases. It
suffices to point out that no antiremoval presumption attends cases
invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of
certain class actions in federal court.”59 Justice Ginsburg then cited
CAFA’s statement, in its findings and purposes section, that its objective
is to “ensur[e] ‘[f[ederal court consideration of interstate cases of
national importance.’”60
The question that Dart, viewed in conjunction with Professor
Marcus’s earlier article, raises is how far the Court will take this
invocation of CAFA’s statutory purposes. Dart is most obviously
significant for a number of disputes about the interpretation of CAFA’s
home state and local controversy exceptions.61 Lower courts across
several circuits have adopted interpretations of these provisions that
preserve some fairly significant wiggle room for plaintiffs to keep
single-state class actions in state court by manipulating the definition of
the class and the party-structure of the lawsuit.62 The Court’s affirmance

57. Id. at 554.
58. Id. at 553.
59. Id. at 554.
60. Id. (quoting CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)-(4) (2012).
62. One common strategy is to divide a class into a number of different micro classes
composed of fewer than 100 members. Another strategy presents itself in cases where a mass tort
involves the distribution of a product or service through a chain of locally incorporated subsidiaries
or distributors. Here, rather than sue a diverse, deep-pockets manufacturer or parent company,
plaintiffs sue the locally incorporated or headquartered subsidiary or distributor on behalf of a stateonly class in order to take advantage of the home state exception, with recovery sometimes
dependent upon the subsidiaries’ success in seeking contribution or indemnification from the out-ofstate parent or manufacturer. When the defendant in turn impleads the parent or manufacturer, the
success of the strategy depends on whether (1) diverse third party defendants’ citizenship counts
toward CAFA’s grant of original minimum diversity jurisdiction and (2) whether they count as
primary defendants within the meaning of the home state exception to removal. The former issue
may be the subject of some evolving disagreement among the circuits. See Schwartz v. SCI Funeral
Servs. of Fla., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1196 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (holding that third party
defendants’ citizenship counts for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)); Palisades
Collections LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that third party defendants
are not “defendants” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1453). At least some federal circuits, by
contrast, seem to be converging on the view that third party defendants do not count as “primary.”
See, e.g., Vodenichar v. Halcón Energy Props., Inc., 733 F.3d 497, 504-06 (3d Cir. 2013) (reviewing
authorities).
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in Dart that CAFA’s findings section overcomes any “antiremoval
presumption with respect to CAFA” may presage a significant
narrowing of some of these loopholes.
But the types of arguments surveyed by Richard Marcus cast well
beyond the provisions of CAFA and so suggest the possibility future
courts may find in the language quoted by Justice Ginsburg a hook for
expanding, for example, the scope of federal class actions. Smith v.
Bayer Corp., though, indicates that the Court, at least for the time being,
seems to be taking a much narrower view of the interpretive value of
CAFA’s findings section. This is the second major federalismreinforcing development in the Roberts Court’s class action canon.
Bayer involved mass litigation targeting Bayer for injuries linked to
Baycol, one of the pharmaceutical company’s anti-cholesterol drugs.63
Federal suits against the company were consolidated in the District of
Minnesota by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.64 Two
different plaintiffs, however, filed duplicative class actions on behalf of
West Virginia Baycol purchasers.65 One of these (the McCollins class
action) was removed to federal court and swept into the MDL.66 The
other (the Smith class action) named two non-diverse West Virginia
companies as defendants and, because it was filed before CAFA’s
effective date, was not removable.67
The federal MDL court denied certification of the McCollins class
action.68 Bayer then moved to enjoin the plaintiff in the Smith action
from relitigating the certification of the West Virginia class.69 Although
the Anti-Injunction Act generally forbids the issuance of injunctions
against proceedings in state court, it contains an exception permitting
injunctions to prevent relitigation of issues foreclosed by binding federal
judgments, which Bayer invoked.70 The key question in the case, then,
was whether the exception applied, which turned on (1) whether the
certification issues in the Smith action were the same as those resolved in
the McCollins action, and (2) whether the Smith plaintiffs, who were
members of the putative federal class in the McCollins action, were
sufficiently in privity with the McCollins plaintiffs, such that they could
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
(1988).

Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2373 (U.S. 2011).
Id. at 2373.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2374.
Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012); Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/6

12

Moller: The New Class Action Federalism

2015]

THE NEW CLASS ACTION FEDERALISM

873

be bound by the federal class certification order.
In its briefs before the Supreme Court, Bayer invoked CAFA’s
policies, among other arguments:
CAFA reflects Congress’s judgment that duplicative state-court class
actions serve no useful purpose, harm interstate commerce, and cause
an “enormous waste” of party and judicial resources by forcing “multiple judges of different courts [to] spend considerable time adjudicating precisely the same claims asserted on behalf of precisely the same
people.” The same policies that Congress found supported the expansion of federal jurisdiction in CAFA should be weighed here in determining under federal common law whether a federal judgment denying
71
class certification may be relitigated in state court.

The Court, however, sided with the plaintiff for a couple of reasons.
First, it said, in the “absence of a certification under [Rule 23], the
precondition for binding Smith was not met.”72 “Neither a proposed
class action nor a rejected class action,” it noted, “may bind
nonparties.”73 “What does have this [binding] effect is a class action
approved under Rule 23,” the Court continued. “But McCollins’ lawsuit
was never that.”74
Moreover, stressed the Court, “as we said more than thirty years
ago, and have consistently maintained since that time, ‘[a]ny doubts
[about the propriety of antisuit injunctions] should be resolved in favor
of permitting the state courts to proceed.’”75 Under this approach, close
cases have easy answers: The federal court should not issue an
injunction.
The Court noted that Congress could change these principles by
authorizing preclusion of members of a putative class.76 But it hadn’t.
What it had done, instead, was pass CAFA, which provides “a remedy
that does not involve departing from the usual rules of preclusion”—
namely, removal of duplicative putative classes into federal court.77 That
remedy was admittedly “cold comfort” to Bayer, given that the
plaintiffs’ action had been filed before the effective date of CAFA’s
removal provisions; but it is the “remedy” the political process has
71. Brief for Respondent at 17, Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (U.S. 2011) (No. 09125) (emphasis added).
72. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2380.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2382 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398
U.S. 281, 297 (1970)).
76. Id. at 2382 n.12.
77. Id. at 2381-82.
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provided and the one, the Court implied, that future defendants must rely
on.78
III. THE ROBERTS COURT AND MASS LITIGATION: A CASE OF
ACCIDENTAL FEDERALISM?
While Bayer did not explicitly discuss the effect of CAFA’s
findings, the upshot of the decision is clear: CAFA’s policy (which its
findings and purposes section describes) has no bearing on settled
principles governing the scope of federal courts’ power over massinjury-event litigation that were not addressed in CAFA, like the scope
of antisuit injunctions.
After Bayer, some defense-side commentators suggested the case is
a relatively minor decision, one with little real significance post-CAFA
(since, under CAFA, duplicative state level litigation of the type at issue
in Bayer could simply be dealt with by removing it into federal court).79
Bayer may in fact stand for something more significant—a set of
structural principles that connect back to the Roberts Court’s approach to
class certification and, in the process, provide a basis of a principled,
wholesale defense of the Roberts Court’s seemingly accidental mass
litigation federalism. This part develops this idea.
A.

Mass Litigation Federalism and the Separation of Powers

Arguments of the type surveyed by Richard Marcus treat federalism
as a social mood or zeitgeist, discerned in part through the product of
Congress’s legislative output, like CAFA. Once the modern federalism
Weltanschauung is glimpsed through enactments like CAFA’s findings,
courts draw on it as inspiration to shape and update a variety of statutory
provisions that govern the area of complex litigation, including CAFA,
Rule 23 itself, the Rules of Decision Act,80 the Anti-Injunction Act,81
and more.
Bayer points toward a quite different way to think about federalism
in the mass litigation context: through the lens of separation of powers.
As work by Professors Brad Clark and Ernest Young explores,
separation of powers is, as Professor Young put it, “an aspect of
78. Id. at 2382.
79. See James M. Beck, It Should Be an Interesting Couple of Weeks, DRUG & DEVICE LAW
(June 16, 2011), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2011/06/it-should-be-interesting-coupleof.html (arguing Bayer amounts to a minor case).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012).
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federalism.”82 Young refers to Herbert Weschler’s familiar idea that the
political process is a safeguard of federalism.83 In Clark’s and Young’s
updated version of the argument, Congress’s control of federal
lawmaking protects state autonomy because the difficult process of
federal lawmaking leads to inertia, checking or slowing the expansive
tendencies of federal authority.84
Congress’s primacy over lawmaking is compelled by constitutional
text, historical practice, and functional considerations.85 Professor
Young, in turn, identifies a variety of clear-statement-type rules that
federal courts have developed to enforce that primacy. All of these tend
to reinforce separation of powers as a federalism safeguard by directing
federal courts to interpret ambiguous federal statutes in a way that
preserves state autonomy, thereby forcing decisions to make inroads on
that autonomy through the political process.86
Although Professors Young and Clark focus mostly on separation
of powers in the regulatory field, the framers, by putting Congress in
control of federal jurisdiction, also embraced separation of powers as a
federalism safeguard in the arena of judicial federalism. Just as the
Supremacy Clause puts Congress in control of federal lawmaking in
order to protect states’ policymaking autonomy, Articles I and III
together give Congress broad control over federal courts and federal
jurisdiction in order to protect state courts from encroachment by their
federal counterparts.87 And, indeed, the well-worn idea that limits on
federal courts’ authority are enforced by “interpretation” (meaning that
Congress must speak pretty clearly in order to expand federal
jurisdiction) is one of the oldest examples of the enforcement of the
separation of powers through what amounts to a clear statement norm.88
82. Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 128.
83. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954).
84. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001); Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
10 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 17 (2013).
85. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 84, at 1326 (developing a textual argument based on the
Supremacy Clause); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional
Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733 (2005) (developing
functional arguments for Congress’s supremacy).
86. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000).
87. Mark Moller, The Checks and Balances of Forum Shopping, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG.
107, 116-17 (2012).
88. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164-65
(2008) (quoting Am. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951)) (emphasizing the
“established principle that ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against
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It’s easy to see these principles at work in Bayer, which explicitly
draws on a political-process-reinforcing clear statement norm—e.g.,
exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act are construed narrowly—in the
course of ruling for the petitioners.89 And, indeed, the invocation of
these principles in the anti-suit injunction cases is hardly
revolutionary—the Court has been invoking separation of powers norms
as a reason to read the statute’s exceptions narrowly for decades.
But these principles also have a strong claim apply to questions
where we don’t often think about them, like the proper scope of class
certification. The idea that separation of powers norms are a constraint
on the scope of class certification seems odd at first glance, but only
because the conventional understanding is that the combined force of (1)
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and (2) the underlying
contours of parties’ substantive rights imposes the sole external
constraints on when classes can be certified under Rule 23.
What, though, if these constraints aren’t as constraining as
conventional wisdom thinks? Recent scholarship by David Rosenberg
and Sergio Campos has chipped away at the understanding that due
process imposes very significant constraints on the use of mandatory
classing in the mass tort context.90 There is also some reason to doubt
that substantive law is actually as constraining as defendants’ routinely
argue it is.91 If these constraints prove less durable than have been
imagined, the scope for federal courts’ exercise of discretionary
judgment to authorize representative actions may be quite broad—
unless, of course, there are other reasons to cautiously or narrowly apply
the class action rule.
I have argued elsewhere that one reason is the class action’s role as
a mechanism for preempting states’ coordinate control over litigation
arising out of mass events. The rules governing the scope for class
certification are part of the system of rules that are constitutive of our
system of judicial federalism. Because our system of separated powers
places the elaboration of these framework rules in Congress’s hands,
Congress has a special claim to control the availability of the federal
class action, no less than other framework rules that regulate federal
courts’ authority in the federal system.92
The result, if you accept this argument, is that respect for separation
expansion by judicial interpretation . . .’”).
89. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (U.S. 2011).
90. See Moller, supra note 9, at 3-7 (reviewing these arguments).
91. Id. at 27-31 (making this argument).
92. For an extensive development of this argument, see id. at 31-56.
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of powers offers another layer of support for the narrow interpretation of
Rule 23’s class provisions (like the limitation of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to
limited funds93) and could favor a presumption, along the lines suggested
by Richard Epstein, that Rule 23(b)(3) is unavailable for individually
marketable tort claims arising out of sprawling mass torts.94 Presented
with broad and narrow interpretations of the scope of Rule 23, a
notoriously indeterminate provision, federal courts ought to adopt the
narrowest interpretation consistent with the Rule’s text—leaving the
decision to greenlight more expansive approaches to class certification,
and with it greater inroads on state autonomy, to Congress and its
surrogate, the federal rulemaking process.
One common objection to this idea is that Congress’s delegation of
rulemaking authority to federal courts obviates separation of powers or
federalism concerns with more expansive judicial interpretations of the
class action rule.95 But this objection fails to grapple with the import of
the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act,96 which, as Catherine
Struve shows, were intended to replicate many of the inertial, democratic
checks on rulemaking that exist within the legislative system writ
large.97 The experience with the scheme set up by the 1988 amendments
indeed suggests that the inertial drag on federal rulemaking is, at best,
only marginally less constraining than Congress’s lawmaking process—
at least with respect to major, normatively contested changes to the
federal procedural system.98
Moreover, as I have argued in another article, there is good reason
to think that procedural rules that force litigation into the federal system,
like the class action, are at the very edge of the rulemaking power
conferred under the Rules Enabling Act and consistent with it only when
such rules are essential to the enforcement of litigants’ substantive
rights.99 This is a reason not only for the Court, but also rulemakers, to
tread cautiously when it comes to further expansion of the availability of
the class action—leaving innovations to Congress by limiting the scope
of the rule to cases where representative enforcement is plainly essential
93. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
94. See Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: The Need for a Hard Second Look, CIV. JUST.
REP., Mar. 2002, at 14.
95. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV.
LITIG. 313, 336 (2012) (noting this argument for federal courts’ interpretive discretion).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
97. Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (2002).
98. See Mark Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 688-89 (2011).
99. Moller, supra note 87, at 163-66.
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to the enforcement of the underlying substantive scheme.100
Whether we conceive separation of powers as a reason for the
Court to defer to the rulemaking process or as a reason for the Court and
rulemakers to defer to Congress is, though, a side issue, and one on
which I am ultimately agnostic. The bottom line is that separation of
powers principles foreclose decisions by the Supreme Court to update
the class action rule unilaterally, through interpretation of the existing
rule, along the lines sketched by Richard Marcus.101 Doing so clearly
offends separation of powers norms, and deference either to the quasipolitical process of federal rulemaking or to Congress itself would be an
improvement from the standpoint of fidelity to separation of powers
principles.
B.

Bayer and Separation of Powers

What’s fascinating about Bayer is that the case actually points to
this idea, albeit obliquely, in the course of discussing class preclusion.
Part of the Court’s holding turned on its construction of the way that the
principles of federal common law of preclusion sync up with Rule 23. It
held that the re-litigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act did not
apply in the case because the state litigants, members of the proposed or
putative federal class action, were not yet “parties” to the federal
proceeding pre-certification and so could not be bound by the federal
court’s decision to reject certification.102
Although that preclusion principle, like all principles of federal
preclusion, is in part a product of federal common law, it is also the
product of the way the federal class action is conceptualized. The
Court’s holding in Bayer (that putative class members were not bound
by an order rejecting class certification) flows from an understanding
that Rule 23 is a joinder provision that does not actually bring class
members “before the court” in any way important to the Court’s power
to bind prior to the certification order.103
What’s notable about Bayer is its hint (admittedly noncommittal)
that this limit on class preclusion might be changed by Congress.
“Nothing in our holding today,” the Court was careful to underscore,
“forecloses legislation to modify established principles of preclusion

100. Id. at 163-64.
101. See generally Marcus, supra note 2.
102. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380-81 (U.S. 2011).
103. See, e.g., Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?,
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/6

18

Moller: The New Class Action Federalism

2015]

THE NEW CLASS ACTION FEDERALISM

879

should Congress decide that CAFA does not sufficiently prevent
relitigation of class certification motions.”104
The idea that Congress can alter or expand the scope of class
preclusion is not an obvious one. Many commentators have thought the
opposite is true—that limits on pre-certification preclusion are simply
fixed by due process. By reaching out and making this nonobvious
claim, the Court at once puts this idea on the wall and, in the process,
invites a legislative solution that would not otherwise have been
forthcoming.
But more importantly, it also signals a sense that the adjustment to
“established” preclusion principles in the class context should ordinarily
come from Congress when due process gives out as a source for
justifying them—not least, the Court suggests, because binding class
members who would have preferred to proceed in state court jars with
principles of federal-state “comity.”105 There is thus at least a hint in this
passage at an intuition—that limits on the scope and effect of federal
class litigation are not just a function (up to a point) of due process, but
also (even more deeply) a function of entrenchment generated by fidelity
to basic separation of powers and federalism norms.
C.

CAFA Through a Separation of Powers Lens

CAFA, of course, is another typical rejoinder to the idea that
separation of powers principles can be invoked in favor of a narrow
interpretation of the class action rule.106 Following out the logic of
Bayer, though, requires rejecting the idea that CAFA somehow provides
authority for expanding the effect of the class action.
Bayer, recall, had argued CAFA provides a reason for rethinking
the principle that putative class members were not bound by precertification judgments.107 Not so, wrote the Court. “To the extent class
actions raise special problems of relitigation, Congress has provided a
remedy that does not involve departing from the usual rules of
preclusion . . . .”108 Congress, in other words, has adjusted the scope of
removal—it has made federal courts into aggregation gatekeepers—but
it has done nothing to adjust the preclusive effect of the federal class
action.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
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The logical next step in Bayer’s reasoning is that CAFA also does
nothing to affect the scope of federal aggregation itself. While CAFA’s
findings include a generic statement of support for class actions in
consumer rights litigation and a diffuse statement that putative class
actions should be “considered” in federal court109, neither CAFA’s
findings nor its operative provisions say anything about how to resolve
the class certification issue once the case is there, just as they say
nothing about antisuit injunctions or class preclusion.
This is, indeed, a marker of what may be the central compromise in
the statute. As Judge Lee Rosenthal wrote shortly after CAFA’s passage,
the pre-CAFA debate over mass tort management was characterized by a
split between adherents of centralized and decentralized management
models.110 Centralized models of mass litigation—what Judge
Easterbrook once called the “central planning” model (“one case, one
court, one set of rules, one settlement price for all involved”)—
consolidate the management and, ultimately, disposition through
settlement of claims in a central national forum under the management
of a single trial judge.111
Decentralized models break national class actions apart, spreading
disposition of claims arising out of a mass event across multiple courts
in different jurisdictions. This, say advocates, protects horizontal or
state-to-state federalism by preventing one state court from imposing its
policies on every other state.112 Decentralized models also have
informational benefits similar to those characteristic of markets.
“Markets,” Easterbrook wrote in a case rejecting the certification of a
nationwide class action decided just three years before CAFA’s passage:
use diversified decisionmaking to supply and evaluate information.
Thousands of traders affect prices by their purchases and sales over the
course of a crop year. This method looks “inefficient” from the planner’s perspective, but it produces more information, more accurate
113
prices, and a vibrant, growing economy.

The same logic applies not only to markets, but also to mass litigation—
decentralization gives the judicial system and settling parties more
109. CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5.
110. Lee H. Rosenthal, Back in the Court’s Court, 75 UMKC L. REV. 687, 705-06 (2006).
111. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.2d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002).
112. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353, 1416 (2006) (noting that one of the concerns “animating” CAFA was that the
certification of nationwide class actions gave a state the ability to “impose its desired legal standards
on national market conduct”).
113. Bridgestone, 288 F.2d at 1020.
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information about the value of mass tort claims. “When courts think of
efficiency,” Judge Easterbrook concluded, “they should think of market
models rather than central-planning models.”114
CAFA, Judge Rosenthal notes, rightly did not decide between the
two approaches.115 That failure to decide is not only evident in CAFA’s
operative provisions, which say nothing about class certification,116 but
is also evident in the statute’s structure. Take for example CAFA’s
“mass action” provision. The provision authorizes removal of non-class
claims that are “proposed” to be consolidated for trial.117 But it leaves
undisturbed state control over suits that will be resolved on the merits by
separate triers of fact. CAFA also pointedly refused to authorize transfer
of “mass actions” to existing federal MDL proceedings absent the
approval of a majority of the plaintiffs.118
Thus, while the mass action provision reflects concern about state
control of aggregate litigation units, whether these take a class or classsurrogate form, the statute’s solicitude for state control of claims that
will be tried separately and its anti-MDL-transfer proviso signal a
wariness of centralized disposition of the claims when the need to
consider the propriety of aggregation is no longer relevant. It is one
more marker of the compromise nature of CAFA—an agreement to
extend federal control over suits that take an aggregate form in order to
make federal courts the nation’s aggregation gatekeepers, coupled with
an agreement not to agree on how widely federal courts should open the
aggregation gate.
And so treating CAFA as a reason to unravel preexisting limits on
aggregation is, as a result, foreclosed by Bayer’s key take away: that
CAFA’s effect is limited to the operative provisions on which Congress
could agree—namely, adjustments to jurisdiction and removal.
Extending the statute’s effect further would undo the compromise that
produced the statute, and, in the bargain, would also undo federal courts’
subordination to the political process.
CONCLUSION
Bayer, then, turns out to be a potentially significant decision, not a
minor one. It points to separation of powers principles that reach far

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
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beyond the narrow issue in that case to much more fundamental
questions, like how the Court ought to construe Rule 23. In the process,
it points to a way to understand the Roberts Court’s class action
federalism in principled terms—not as “accidental” or “happenstantial”
federalism, but as the outgrowth of a basic separation of powers (and
federalism) principle: that Congress controls federal courts’ role in our
federal system.
One can accept that principle but be entirely agnostic on the
normative value of mass tort litigation federalism. Rather than
expressing a normative commitment to some particular model of federal
and state power, Bayer, understood in the way sketched above, reflects a
formal commitment to the constitutional allocation of institutional
control over rules that regulate the balance of that power between federal
courts and their state counterparts.
Is this structural account something the Roberts Court might
eventually accept? It’s certainly consistent with and, as I’ve suggested in
this Article, hinted at fairly strongly by Bayer. Yet, the Court’s approach
to federalism and separation of powers is notoriously unsettled, and
doctrinal hints in cases often have a way of never materializing.
The key value of the account here, then, is less that it offers an
insight into where the Roberts Court is likely to go, and more that it
offers a corrective, both to the usual overbroad assertions that CAFA
dispels separation of powers and federalism concerns with national class
litigation and that separation of powers and federalism have no claim to
govern the elaboration of class action doctrine.
Federalism, it turns out, is alive and well after CAFA. And the
Roberts Court’s own cases provide the seeds for defending that result in
terms of a coherent set of constitutional principles.
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